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by Jacquelin Collins 
The outstanding political fact of seventeenth-century Britain was the 
execution of Charles 1 on January 30, 1649. King Charles's fatal error was 
to exasperate beyond repair his most dangerous opponents. These men, 
convinced of Charles's bad faith and of his unwill~ngness even after his defeat 
on the field of battle to discuss substantive terms for settling the govern- 
ment, finally resorted to the expedient of cutting off his head. This, of 
course, was not the justification the regicides gave for their actions. William 
Goffe, at a prayer meeting in the New Model Army at the beginning of the 
Second Civil War in 1648, spoke of their being "led and helped to a clear 
agreement . . . to go out and fight against those potent enemies" and of 
their "very clear and joint resolution . . . to call Charles Stuart, that man of 
blood, to an account for that blood he had shed, and mischief he had done 
to his utmost, against the Lord's cause and people in these poor nations."' 
At his trial Charles was formally charged with having "a wicked design 
to erect and uphold in himself an unlimited and Tyrannical Power to rule 
according to his Will, and to overthrow the Rights and Liberties of the 
People." He had "traitorously and maIiciously levyed War against the 
present Parliament, and the People therein represented." And in conclusion, 
"the said Charles Stuart hath been, and is the Occasioner, Author, and 
Continuer of the said unnatural, cruel and bloody Wars, and therein guilty 
of all the Treasons, Murders, Rapines, Burnings, Spoils, Desolations, 
Damages, and Mischiefs to this Nation, acted and committed in the said 
Wars, or occasioned thereby." The special tribunal found the king guilty, 
and "For all which Treasons and Crimes this Court doth adjudg, That he 
the said Charles Stuart, as a Tyrant, Traitor, Murderer, and publick Enemy 
to the good People of this Nation, shall be put to death by the severing of 
his Head from his Body."l Charles, on the scaffold three days later, esti- 
mated his situation otherwise: "If 1 would have given way to an Arbitrary 
Way, for to have all Laws changed according to the Power of the Sword, 1 
needed not to have come here; and therefore 1 tell you (and I pray God it be 
not laid to your Charge) that 1 am the Martyr of the People."' 
lnteresting as are the personal and political troubles of Charles and 
Britain, my concern is not with them, but with the association of the ideas of 
treason and tyranny with the idea, now become a fact, that a king could be 
brought to trial and executed for what a victorious opposition asserted were 
the misdeeds of his government, and finally with the crisis caused by the 
resulting confusion as to just what was the law and the foundation of govern- 
ment. This raises the incident above the personal tragedy of a king who 
mismanaged and lost his kingdom and forfeited his life into the bargain. 
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English kings had lost their thrones and lives before, in 1327 and 1399, not 
to  mention in 1066 and 1485 and even 1461. Previously, they had either 
been killed in battle fighting to retain their thrones, or they simply had been 
forced to abdicate. Though in the latter situation death had usually come 
quickly in the wake of abdication, even as a consequence of it, death was 
not a necessary legal corollary of removal from office. Not until Charles 1 
in 1649 was a king sentenced to death for his actions as king; not till then 
had a king, in the words attributed to  Oliver Cromwell, had his head cut 
off "with the crown on it."4 
Michael Walzer, in his provocative book The Revolution oj'the Saints: A 
Study of the Origins ofRadic~a1 Politics, puts a t  the head of his list of new 
elements illustrating the effect of a new revolutionary politics "the judicial 
murder-and not the assassination-of King Charles 1; the trial of the king 
in 1649 was," heasserts, "a bold exploration into the very nature of monarchy 
rather than a personal attack upon Charles himself."5 
Cecily Veronica Wedgwood, in her recent essay "The I'rial of Charles 1," 
is characteristically more interested in the narrative of events than in the 
ideas behind them. Not surprisingly, she comes to the conclusion that, 
though the trial "remains the dramatic high point of the struggle between 
King and Parliament, its political significance was, in the long run, far less 
than was anticipated. It did not end the monarchy; it did not create a Re- 
public. It was an incident far more remarkable in itself than in its conse- 
quences." Nevertheless, after showing the resoluteness of the regicides and 
the fanaticism of the king, she says in passing that the "trial presented, in 
its most dramatic form, a confrontation between two irreconcilable theories 
of government.*'h 
Not quite so recently, Charles Howard Mcllwain, in the conclud- 
ing chapter of his Growth oj' Political Thought in the West, focused 
briefly on the significance of English constitutional developments in the 
seventeenth century. Following with approval Jean Bodin's late sixteenth- 
century theory of sovereignty, McIlwain asserted that 
the Engl~sh monarchy, and, in fact, every monarchy ot the h~ghest type existing In a 
free state, must needs be "absolute" IS it is to effect ~ t b  great purpose ot securing and 
enforcing peace and justice, a monarchy founded in law and based on ancient custom. 
I R  whlch the "soveretgn" IS free from ordlnary law but bound by those fundamental 
rules whlch.deflne h e  author~ty In the state, and in every monarchy of this highest type 
these fundamental rules ~nclude the medlev;~l prlnciplc that the subjects' goods are the11 
own, to  be taken by the ruler only "by the common assent of all the realm and for the 
common profit thereof."' 
T o  McIlwain, the "English civil wars of the seventeenth century"-if 
not specifically the trial and execution of the king-"roughly threw English 
political thought permanently out of its true orbit and substituted a theory 
of might for a theory of law."K Whether o r  not so  absolute a judgment should 
be allowed to  stand unchallenged, there is no reason to quibble with 
McIlwain's understanding of medieval theory o r  with his assertion of the 
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importance of what was happening in England in the seventeenth century. 
The medieval English constitution was the product of the balance between 
king and feudal barons, between order and v io l en~e .~  Medieval regard for 
the sanctity of law and custom was due not to the character of a people 
naturally litigious and respectful of the law but to the practical needs of a 
violent age, where men understood the harsh realities of a society whose 
members were ever ready to resort to armed self-help. In the Middle Ages 
the state of nature, which in Hobbesian fashion lurked behind civilized 
society and threatened to return at any moment, was not Hobbes's war of 
individuals but of families and factions. The practical escape was not to the 
sure protection of Hobbes's almighty king but to the relative security of a 
limited violence, regulated by laws and custom and in fact reflecting the 
actual power structure of the age. The authority of each man or institution 
was appropriate to his or its proper sphere. Kings were sovereign in the 
administration of their kingdoms, but so were barons in their baronies; and 
lesser men and institutions possessed just as absolutely their own particular 
and appropriate rights. The law reflected this balance. And though the law's 
importance for maintaining the scarce-and therefore precious-peace 
was recognized, what safeguarded the law's existence and guaranteed its 
enforcement was never forgotten. The last resort was that of the barons at 
Runnymede. It is easily understandable that the law, being so important, 
was thought to  be beyond the ability of man to create or alter. 
In England at the beginning of the seventeenth century the traditional 
balance between prerogative and law still obtained. Despite the writings of 
Jean Bodin and others, however, the practical maintenance of this balance 
was sometimes proving difficult. In the judgment of Chief Faron Fleming in 
Bate's case in 1606 the formulas were correct, but their interpretation was 
tilted in favor of the king: 
The King's power IS double, ordinary and itbsolute, and they have several laws and ends. 
That of the ordinary IS tor the prolit of particulai subjects, for the execution of civil 
justice . ; and thls is exercised by equlty and justlce in ordinary courts, and . . . IS 
nominated . . . common law, and these laws cannot be changed w~thout  parliament. 
. . The absolute power of the King is not that which is converted or executed to private 
use, to the benefit of any particular person, but is only that which is applted to the gen- 
eral benefit of the people, and is ~rrl~i.\ pol~ul i ;  as the people is the body, and the King the 
head; and this power is . . . moat properly named policy and government; and as the 
constitution of this body var~eth with the tlme. so \.:trleth this absolute law, accord~ng 
to the w~sdom of the King, for thecommon good.lU 
Two years earlier, in the Apology of the House of Commons, can be found 
the same traditional terminology, but with a somewhat different emphasis. 
Here the members of the Commons were concerned w ~ t h  "misinformation" 
dangerously possessed by the king: 
Against which assertions, most gracious Sovere~gn, tending directly and apparently to 
the utter overthrow of the very fundamental priv~lege\ 01 our House, and therein of the 
r~ghts and l~berties of the whole Commons ot your realm ol England . . . we . do ex- 
pressly protest, as being derogatory In the h~ghest degiee to the true dignity, l~berty and 
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author~ty of your Majesty's high court of parliament and consequently to the rlghts of 
all your Majesty's s a ~ d  subjects and the whole body of thts your k~ngdom, and dealre 
that t h ~ s  our protestation may be recorded to all posterity. . . . [Alga~nst these mlsln- 
format~ons we most truly avouch . . . that our pr~v~leges and l~ber t~es  are our  r ~ g h t  and 
due inher~tance, no less than our very lands and goods." 
These statements are not out of line with the aphorism from Seneca, "to 
kings belongs authority over all; to private persons, property," which 
McIlwain chose to conclude his study of medieval political thought and 
which he asserted "best comprises the living political conceptions of the 
later middle ages."'2 Yet, in the differences between the two statements 
and between the understandings they portray-specifically as to the disputed 
boundary between "authority" and "property"-one can see coming the 
troubles that later were manifested so graphically in the Puritan Revolution. 
The origin and causes of the Puritan Revolution have been one of the 
hottest topics of English historical research and controversy for more than 
two decades.13 Perhaps it is enough to say that by the second quarter of the 
century the English government and church no longer satisfied as many 
people, especially those with a positive basis for political power and influence, 
as they left uneasy and annoyed. Once the revolution had begun, things 
becameincreasingly blurred. Yet a few signposts can be discerned. 'The king's 
free exercise of his prerogative in law courts, in taxation, and in summoning 
parliament was attacked and curtailed. His advisers, most especially the 
Earl of Strafford and Archbishop William Laud, were arrested and, interest- 
ing for our purposes, charged with treason, which offense was beginning its 
transmogrification from a crime against the king and through him the king- 
dom and people to a crime against the kingdom and people directly, as we 
have already seen in the case of Charles 1. 
The breakdown of government brought the refurbishing of old ideas and 
the generation of new sufficient to influence either directly or indirectly all the 
revolutions that havetaken place in Europe since then. The practical problem 
of settling England's government once the king and kingship had been de- 
stroyed proved to be only temporary. After a decade of constitutional ex- 
perimentation and after the death of Cromwell, the only man with sufficient 
talent and force of character to maintain order amidst instability, the mon- 
archy was happily restored. The restoration of Charles 11 in 1660, like the 
ending of a lovers' quarrel, brought a happy reunion but no settling of the 
issues that had caused the trouble in the first place, Two practical lessons 
had nevertheless been learned: that intransigence in a king could be fatal, 
and that drastic remedies effected by disgruntled subjects could prove fruit- 
less. The second time around, in 1688 and 1689, everyone played his part to 
perfection: James I1 promptly ran away; William and Mary, his successors, 
arrived on cue and found immediate acceptance; and parliament quickly 
effected a moderate and popular settlement. Can one wonder that the 
English, recalling the great rebellion of a half century before, called this 
revolution glorious? Parliament, having presided over the execution of one 
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king, the firing of a second, and now the taking on of a third, was demon- 
strably the dominant element in the government of the kingdom. And more 
important, England had achieved a constitutional stability, which for the 
better part of a century it had been without, and on w h ~ c h  basis in the next 
several decades a new political stability could be built.13 
How different was the year of the trial and execution of Charles 1, when 
the minimal existing stability was but that of victorious arms. Algernon 
Sidney, when he discovered that without his permission he had been named 
to the commission to try the king, protested "first, the king could be tried by 
no court; secondly, that no man could be tried by that court."jj This is 
similar to Charles's own refusal to acknowledge the court that tried him and 
to his assessment that, "1 speak not for my own Right alone, as I am your 
King, but also for the true liberty of all my Subjects, which consists not in 
the power of Government but in living under such Laws, such a Government, 
as may give themselves the best assurance of their Lives, and property of 
their Goods."'"n this sense, Charles was, as he said, "the Martyr of the 
People," or a t  least a martyr for the laws and government as he understood 
them. T o  Sidney's denial that the king could be tried, Cromwell made his 
famous reply, "I tell you we will cut off his head, with the crown on it."17 
Especially in the face of the king's posture at his trial and the heroic dignity 
of his death, the claims of the regicides seem less the assertion of legat 
principle than the angry resolution of frustrated preemi~ence.  In the trial of 
the king, in the abolition of the monarchy and of the House of Lords, and 
in the proclamation that henceforth England was a Commonwealth, there 
is a sense of overriding expediency. Cromwell and the others who were 
directing things had the power, and thus to all practical purposes what they 
ordained was law. Here in fact and deed was the embodiment of Thomas 
Hobbes's Leviathan. 
Quentin Skinner has asserted that this is true in more than a figurative 
sense, that Hobbes, whose Lxviufhan was publ~shed in 165 1 ,  and who the 
following year ended his eleven-year exile and took u p  residence in England, 
was the last and most important of a serles of writers-Francis Kous, An- 
thony Ascham, Marchamont Nedham, and Francis Osborne among others 
-advocating the de fucto acceptance of the government of the Comrnon- 
wealth and basing their arguments on progressively more secular grouhds. 
The common basis in Hobbe5 and in "the other lay theorists of' de ./~c.to 
powers, lies in the claim that there is a mutual relat~on between the duty of 
the sovereign to protect his subjects and the duty of his subjects to obey." 
Skinner quotes Hobbes to  emphasize the latter's "claim that 'the end of 
obedience is protection' " and his acknowledgment that the Leviathan "was 
written 'without other design than to set before men's eyes the mutual rela- 
tion between protection and obedience.' " I X  
Arguments of might making right have, however, never seemed very 
satisfying, and seldom is the justification of anything left on that basis alone. 
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The regicides certainly attempted to  justify their cutting off the klng's head 
with other arguments. Even Hobbes, the most resolute of' those arguing for 
obedience to a government newly established by conquest, does not rest with 
force as the ultimate justification of government. Perez Zagorin has asserted, 
rightly I feel, "that subjects, in Hobbes's view, retain significant original 
liberties in civil society." And again, "for Hobbes it remains emphatically 
the case that the sovereign exists for the people's sake, and not the other 
way around. Because of this, he was compelled to admit that the sovereign 
had a moral obligation, the obligation to act rationally." And Hobbes is 
quoted, "he, who being placed in authority, shall use his power otherwise 
than to  the safety of the people, will act against the reasons of peace, that is 
to  say, against the laws of nature."!') 
Morton A. Kaplan went further in the same d~rection,  seeing a distinction 
in Hobbes between men and subjects: "It is the subject, the artificial member 
of that artificial person the state, who is bound by artificial chains, i.e., by 
the law. The subject lacks rights; man does not." "[Wlith respect to  a par- 
ticular and existing state, men, as distinguished from subjects, have an  
interest distinct from that of the state." "[Nlatural men need not perish with 
the state and their actions ought always to be governed by their reason." 
Kaplan, to my satisfaction, answers the question he asked in the title of his 
article, "How Sovereign is Hobbes' Sovereign?": "Thus Leviathan, as  a 
theory of sovereignty, establishes only a sovereignty over subjects, not over 
natural men. It does not-and is not intended to-establish an extra- 
individual source of obligation, whether by consent or by any other means.""J 
John Austin, the nineteenth-century follower of Thomas Hobbes and of 
Jeremy Bentham, emphasized the positive character of law deriving its 
validity and force solely from the all-powerful sovereign lawgiver. Yet he 
also acknowledged the continuing responsibility of the sovereign to the 
people, based not on the positive law but on its utilitarian foundation." 
Especially interesting is Austin's description of the first of what he identified 
as Hobbes's two "capital errors": 
He Inculcates too absolutely the rellg~ous obllgatlon of obedience to present 01 estab- 
l~shed government. He makes not the requlsrte allow;~ncc for the anomalous and ex- 
cepted cases wheretn disobedience ts counselled by that ~ c ~ y  p r ~ n c ~ p l e  ot u t ~ l ~ t y  which 
lndlcates the duty of s u b m i s ~ ~ o n  Wr~tlng In a season of clvll dlsco~d,  or wrltlng In ap- 
prehension of its approach, hc naturally llxcd h ~ s  attenrlon to the glar~ng mlschlel\ of 
resistance, and scarcely adverted to  the rn~sc l i~ef~  wh~ch obedlerice occas~onally engcn- 
ders And although hts Integnty was not less remark,thle tllan the glganttc strength of 
hls understanding, we may pre~umc that h ~ s  extreme t ~ r n ~ d ~ t y  somewhat co~ruptcd 111s 
judgment, ahd incllned hlm to lnslst unduly upon the evils ol rcbell~on and s t r~ le  '? 
Must all end then in confusion? A king, executed for treason, is, in fact, 
a martyr of the people and for the security of the Iaws that he himself had 
surely violated. Regicides call upon the law and the righteousness of God 
to justify their obviously illegal trial and execution of the king. Hobbes's 
seeming assertion that might makes right is perhaps not a s  well founded as 
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it at  first appears. And even John Austin, whose absolute sovereignty is 
lamented and scorned, seems less than steadfast in his awful claims. "Vanity 
ofvanities, saith the preacher, vanity of vanities; all is vanity." 
Perhaps it would not be too great a violence to Mcllwain and the thought 
of the Middle Ages to suggest that the distinction between poIicy, or ad- 
ministration or royal prerogative, and the law should be extended and 
liberalized; to suggest that there must invariably be a distinction between, 
on the one hand, government and administration as expressed in institutions, 
statutes, and even precedents and custom, and, on the other, a popular and 
official sense of the fitting and appropriate, the just and the virtuous. This 
latter must by and large be unexpressed and inarticulate, for it is ever being 
forged anew in the white-hot spark of a troubled conscience confronted by 
its duty, and by institutions stretched by circumstances beyond the limits of 
established answers and procedures. Such was the situation at the trial and 
execution of Charles 1 in 1649, and such was the environment that produced 
not only Thomas Hobbes but other happier and more optimistic writers, all 
of whom felt compelled by the times to articulate their thoughts and put 
them on paper. Perhaps the proper conclusion is to be drawn not from the 
anarchy of ideas and the rule of force but from the need broadly felt by men 
to justify what they are doing by an appeal to an outside reference, divine 
ordinance, custom, a concept of justice dictated by a rule of reason, or even 
a generous understanding of utility. If  there exists a higher law than that of 
might or of transient expediency it is surely to be found in the troubled 
minds and hearts of those who are confronted with such experiences as the 
trial and execution of Charles 1. 
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